CHAPTER
TWELVE
In the columned Lady Chapel, with its
hat-racks and its Magnascos, its Brancusi
and its Etruscan sarcophagus used as an umbrella-stand, Jeremy Pordage began, all of a sudden, to feel himself more
cheerful and at home.
'It's
as though one were walking into the mind of a lunatic,' he said, smiling
happily, as he hung up his hat and followed the others into the great
hall. 'Or, rather, an idiot,' he
qualified. 'Because I suppose a
lunatic's a person with a one-track mind.
Whereas this ...' - he made a circular gesture - 'this is a no-track
mind. No-track because
infinity-track. It's the mind of an
idiot of genius. Positively
stuffed with the best that has been thought and said.' He pronounced the phrase with a kind of
old-maidish precision that made it sound entirely ludicrous. 'Greece, Mexico, backsides, crucifixions,
machinery, George IV, Amida Buddha, science,
Christian Science, Turkish baths - anything you like to mention. And every item is perfectly irrelevant to
every other item.' He rubbed his hands together, he twinkled delightedly through his bifocals. 'Disquieting at first. But, do you know? I'm beginning to enjoy it. I find I really rather like living inside an
idiot.'
'I
don't doubt it,' said Mr Propter,
matter-of-factly. 'It's a common taste.'
Jeremy
was offended. 'One wouldn't have thought
this sort of thing was very common,' he said, nodding in the direction of the
Greco.
'It
isn't,' Mr Propter agreed. 'But you can live in an idiot-universe
without going to the expense of actually constructing it out of ferro-concrete and filling it with works of art.'
There
was a pause while the entered the lift.
'You
can live inside a cultural idiot,' Mr Propter went
on. 'Inside a
patchwork of mutually irrelevant words and bits of information. Or, if you're a lowbrow, you can live in the
idiot world of the homme moyen sensuel - the world
where the irrelevances consist of newspapers and baseball, of sex and worry, of
advertising and money and halitosis and keeping up with the Joneses. There's a hierarchy of idiocies. Naturally, you and I prefer the classiest
variety.'
The
elevator came to a halt. Pete opened the
gate, and they stepped out into the whitewashed corridor of the
sub-sub-basement.
'Nothing like an idiot-universe if you want a quiet irresponsible
life. That is, provided you can
stand the idiocy,' Mr Propter added. 'A lot of people can't. After a time, they get tired of their
no-track world. They feel the need of
being concentrated and directed. They
want their lives to have some sense.
That's when they go communist, or join the Church of Rome, or take up
with the Oxford Group. Anything, provided it will make them one-trackers. And, of course, in the overwhelming majority
of cases they choose the wrong track. Inevitably. Because
there are a million wrong tracks and only one right - a million ideals, a
million projections of personality, and only one God and one beatific
vision. From no-track idiocy most of
them pass on to some one-track lunacy, generally criminal. It makes them feel better, of course; but,
pragmatically, the last state is always worse than the first. If you don't want the only thing worth
having, my advice is: Stick to idiocy. - Is this where you work?' he went on in
another tone, as Jeremy opened the door of his vaulted study. 'And those the
Hauberk Papers, I take it. Plenty of them. The
title's extinct, isn't it?'
Jeremy
nodded. 'And so's the family - or very nearly. Nothing left but two old maids in a haunted
house without any money.' He twinkled,
uttered his little preparatory cough and, patting his bald crown, said with an
exaggerated precision. 'Decayed gentlewomen.'
Exquisite locution! It was one of
his favourites. 'And the decay must have
gone pretty far,' he added. 'Otherwise
they wouldn't have sold the papers.
They've refused all previous offers.'
'How
fortunate one is, not to belong to an ancient family!' said Mr Propter. 'All those inherited loyalties to bricks and
mortar, all those obligations to tombstones and bits of paper and painted
canvases!' He shook his head. 'What a dismal form of compulsory idolatry.'
Jeremy,
meanwhile, had crossed the room, opened a drawer and returned with a file of
papers which he handed to Mr Propter. 'Look at these.'
Mr
Propter looked.
'From Molinos!' he said in surprise.
'I
thought that would be your cup of tea,' said Jeremy, deriving a sly pleasure
from talking about mysticism in the most absurdly inappropriate language.
Mr
Propter smiled.
'My cup of tea,' he repeated. 'But not my favourite blend.
There was something not quite right about poor Molinos. A strain of - how shall I put it? - of negative sensuality.
He enjoyed suffering. Mental
suffering, the dark night of the soul - he really wallowed in it. No doubt, poor fellow, he sincerely believed
he was destroying self-will; but, without his being aware of it, he was always
turning the process of destruction into another affirmation of self-will. Which was a pity,' Mr Propter
added, taking the letters to the light, to look at them more closely. 'Because he certainly did
have some first-hand experience of reality. Which only shows that
you're never certain of getting there, even when you've come near enough to see
what sort of thing you're going to.
Here's a fine sentence,' he put in parenthetically. '"Ame a Dios,"'
he read aloud, '"
Jeremy
almost laughed. The coincidence that Mr Propter should have picked on the same passage as had
caught Dr Obispo's eye that morning gave him a peculiar satisfaction. 'Pity he couldn't have read a little Kant,'
he said. 'Dios
en si seems to be much the same as Ding an sich. Unknowable by the human
mind.'
'Unknowable
by the personal human mind,' Mr Propter
agreed, 'because personality is self-will, and
self-will is the negation of reality, the denial of God. So far as the ordinary human personality is
concerned, Kant is perfectly right in saying that the thing in itself is
unknowable. Dios
en si can't be comprehended by a consciousness
dominated by an ego. But now suppose
there were some way of eliminating the ego from consciousness. If you could do this, you'd get close
to reality, you'd be in a position to comprehend Dios
en si.
Now, the interesting thing is that, as a matter of brute fact, this
thing can be done, has been done again and again. Kant's blind alley is for people who choose
to remain on the human level. If you
choose to climb on to the level of eternity, the impasse no longer
exists.'
There
was a silence. Mr Propter
turned over the sheets, pausing every now and then to decipher a line or two of
the fine calligraphy. '"Tres maneras hay de silencio,"' he read aloud after a moment. '"El primero es de palabras,
el segundo de deseos y el tercero de pensamientos." He writes nicely, don't you think? Probably that had a lot to do with his
extraordinary success. How disastrous
when a man knows how to say the wrong things in the right way! Incidentally,' he added, looking up with a
smile into Jeremy's face, 'how few great stylists have ever said any of the
right things. That's one of the troubles
about education in the humanities. The best that has been thought and said. Very nice. But best in which way? Alas, only in form. The content is generally deplorable.' He turned back to the letters. After a moment, another passage caught his
attention. '"Oirá
y leera el hombre racional estas espirituales materias, pero no llegera, dice San Pablo, a comprenderlas:
Animalis homo non percipit
ea quae sunt spiritus."
And not merely animalis homo,' Mr
Propter commented.
'Also humanus
homo. Indeed, above all humanus homo.
And you might even add that humanus
homo non percipit ea quae sunt animalis. Insofar as we think as strictly human beings,
we fail to understand what is below us no less than what is
above. And then there's a further
trouble. Suppose we stop thinking in a
strictly human fashion; suppose we make it possible for ourselves to have
direct intuitions of the non-human realities in which, so to speak, we're
imbedded. Well and good. But what happens when we try to pass on the
knowledge so acquired? We're
floored. The only vocabulary at our
disposal is a vocabulary primarily intended for thinking strictly human
thoughts about strictly human concerns.
But the things we want to talk about are non-human realities and
non-human ways of thinking. Hence the radical inadequacy of all statements about our animal
nature and, even more, of all statements about God or spirit, or eternity.'
Jeremy
uttered a little cough. 'I can think of
some pretty adequate statements about ...' he paused, beamed, caressed his polished scalp; 'well, about the more intime aspects of our animal nature,' he
concluded demurely. His face suddenly
clouded; he had remembered his treasure-trove and Dr Obispo's impudent theft.
'But
what does their adequacy depend on?' Mr Propter
asked. 'Not so much on the writer's
skill as the reader's response. The
direct, animal intuitions aren't rendered by words; the words merely remind you
of your memories of similar experiences.
Notus calor
is what Virgil says when he's talking about the sensations experienced by
Vulcan in the embrace of Venus. Familiar heat. No
attempt at description or analysis; no effort to get any kind of verbal
equivalence to the facts. Just a reminder. But
that reminder is enough to make the passage one of the most voluptuous affairs
in Latin poetry. Virgil left the work to
his readers. And, by and large, that's
what most erotic writers are content to do.
The few who try to do the work themselves have to flounder about with
metaphors and similes and analogies. You
know the sort of stuff: fire, whirlwinds, heaven, darts.'
'"The
vale of lilies,"' Jeremy quoted. '"And the bower of bliss."'
'Not
to mention the expense of spirit in a waste of shame,' said Mr Propter; 'and all the other figures of speech. An endless variety, with only one feature in
common - they're all composed of words which don't connote any aspect of the
subject they're suppose to describe.'
'Saying
one think in order to mean another,' Jeremy put in. 'Isn't that one of the possible definitions
of imaginative literature?'
'Maybe,'
Mr Propter answered.
'But what chiefly interests me at the moment is the fact that our
immediate animal intuitions have never been given any but the most summary and
inadequate labels. We say
"red," for example, or "pleasant," and just leave it at
that, without trying to find verbal equivalents for the various aspects of
perceiving redness or experiencing pleasure.'
'Well,
isn't that because you can't go beyond "red" or
"pleasant"?' said Pete.
'They're just facts, ultimate facts.'
'Like
giraffes,' Jeremy added. '"There ain't no such animal" is what the rationalist says,
when he's shown its portrait. And then
in it walks, neck and all!'
'You're
right,' said Mr Propter. 'A giraffe is an ultimate fact. You've got to accept it, whether you like it
or not. But accepting the giraffe
doesn't prevent you from studying and describing it. And the same applies to redness or pleasure
or notus calor. They can be analysed, and the results of the
analysis can be described by means of suitable words. But as a matter of historical fact, this
hasn't been done.'
Pete
nodded slowly. 'Why do you figure that
should be?' he asked.
'Well,'
said Mr Propter, 'I should say it's because men have
always been more interested in doing and feeling than in understanding. Always too busy making good and having
thrills and doing what's "done" and worshipping the local idols - too
busy with all this even to feel any desire to have an adequate verbal
instrument for elucidating their experiences.
Look at the languages we've inherited - incomparably effective in
rousing violent and exciting emotions; an ever-present help for those who want
to get on in the world; worse than useless for anyone who aspires to
disinterested understanding. Hence, even
on the strictly human level, the need for special impersonal languages like
mathematics and technical vocabularies of the various sciences. Wherever men have felt the wish to understand,
they've given up the traditional language and substituted for it another
special language, more precise and, above all, less contaminated with
self-interest. Now, here's a very
significant fact. Imaginative literature
deals mainly with the everyday life of men and women; and the everyday life of
men and women consists, to a large extent, of immediate animal
experiences. But the makers of
imaginative literature have never forged an impersonal, uncontaminated language
for the elucidation of immediate experiences.
They're content to use the bare, unanalysed names of experiences as mere
aids to their own and their reader's memory.
Every direct intuition is notus calor, with the connotation of the words left open, so
to speak, for each individual reader to supply according to the nature of his
or her particular experiences in the past.
Simple, but not exactly scientific. But then people don't read literature in
order to understand; they read it because they want to re-live the feelings and
sensations which they found exciting in the past. Art can be a lot of things; but in actual
practice most of it is merely the mental equivalent of alcohol and
cantharides.'
Mr
Propter looked down again at the close-set lines of Molinos's epistles. '"Oirá
y leerá el hombre racional estas espirituales materias,"' he read out once more. '"Pero non llegerá a comprenderlas." He'll hear and read these things, but he
won't succeed in understanding them. And
he won't succeed,' said Mr Propter, closing the file
and handing it back to Jeremy, 'he won't succeed for one of two excellent
reasons. Either he has
never seen the giraffes in question, and so, being an hombre racional, knows quite well that there ain't no such animal.
Or else he has had glimpsed of the creatures, or has some other reason
for believing in their existence, but can't understand what the experts say
about them; can't understand because of the inadequacy of the language in which
the fauna of the spiritual world is ordinarily described. In other words, he either hasn't had the
immediate experience of eternity and so has no reason to believe that eternity
exists; or else he does believe that eternity exists, but can't make
head or tail of the language in which it's talked about by those who had had
experience of it. Furthermore, when he
wants to talk about eternity himself - and he may wish to do so, either in
order to communicate his own experiences to others or to understand them
better, from the human point of view, himself - he finds himself on the horns
of a dilemma. For either he recognizes
that the existing language is unsuitable - in which case he has only two
rational choices: to say nothing at all, or to invent a new and better
technical language of his own, a calculus of eternity, so to speak, a special
algebra of spiritual experience - and if he does invent it, nobody who hasn't
learnt it will know what he's talking about.
So much for the first horn of the dilemma. The second horn is reserved for those who
don't recognize the inadequacy of the existing language; or else who do
recognize it, but are irrationally hopeful enough to take a chance with an
instrument which they know to be worthless.
These people will write in the existing language, and their writing will
be, in consequence, more or less completely misunderstood by most of their
readers. Inevitably, because they words
they use don't correspond to the things their talking about. Most of them are words taken from the
language of everyday life.... But the language of everyday life refers almost
exclusively to strictly human affairs.
What happens when you apply words derived from that language to
experiences on the plane of the spirit, the plane of timeless experience? Obviously, you create a misunderstanding; you
say what you didn't mean to say.'
Pete
interrupted him. 'I'd like an example,
Mr Propter,' he said.
'All
right,' the other answered. 'Let's take
the commonest word in all religious literature: "love." Love on the human level means - what? Practically everything from
Mother to the Marquis de Sade.'
The
name reminded Jeremy yet again of what had happened to the Cent-Vingt Jours de Sodome. Really
it was too insufferable! the impudence of it ...!
'We
don't even make the simple Greek distinction between erao
and philo, eros
and agape. With us everything is
just love, whether it's self-sacrificing or possessive, whether it's friendship
or lust or homicidal lunacy. It's all
just love,' he repeated. 'Idiotic word! Even
on the human level it's hopelessly ambiguous.
And when you begin using it in relation to experiences on the level of
eternity - well, it's simply disastrous.
"The love of God." "God's love for
us." "The
saint's love for his fellows."
What does the word stand for in such phrases? And in what way is this related to what it
stands for when it's applied to a young mother suckling her baby? or to Romeo climbing into Juliet's bedroom? or to Othello as he strangles Desdemona? or
to the research worker who loves his science? or to
the patriot who's ready to die for his country - to die and, in the meantime,
to kill, steal, lie, swindle and torture for it? Is there really anything in common between
what the word stands for in these contexts and what it stands for when one talks,
let us say, of the Buddha's love for all sentient beings? Obviously, the answer is: No, there
isn't. On the human level, the word
stands for a great many different states of mind and ways of behaving. Dissimilar in many respects, but alike at
least in this: they're all accompanied by emotional excitement and they all
contain an element of craving. Whereas
the most characteristic features of the enlightened person's experience are
serenity and disinterestedness. In other words, the absence of excitement and the absence of
craving.'
'"The
absence of excitement and the absence of craving,"' Pete said to himself,
while the image of
'Distinctions
in fact ought to be represented by distinctions in language,' Mr Propter was saying.
'If they're not, you can't expect to talk sense. In spite of which, we insist on using one
word to connote entirely different things.
"God is love," we say.
The word's the same as the one we use when we talk about "being in
love," or "loving one's children," or "being inspired by
love of country." Consequently we
tend to think that the thing we're talking about must be more or less the
same. We imagine in a vague, reverential
way, that God is composed of a kind of immensely magnified yearning.' Mr Propter shook
his head. 'Creating
God in our own image. It flatters
our vanity, and of course we prefer vanity to understanding. Hence those confusions of
language. If we wanted to understand
the word, if we wanted to think about it realistically, we should say that we
were in love, but that God was x-love.
In this way, people who had never had any first-hand experience on the
level of eternity would at least be given a chance of knowing intellectually
that what happens on that level is not the same as what happens on the strictly
human level. They'd know, because they'd
seen it in print, that there was some kind of difference between love and x-love. Consequently, they'd have less excuse than
people have today for imagining that God was like themselves, only a bit more
so on the side of respectability and a bit less so, of course, on the other
side. And, naturally, what applies to
the word "love," applies to all the other words taken over from the
language of everyday life and used to describe spiritual experience. Words like "knowledge,"
"wisdom," "power," "mind," "peace,"
"joy," "freedom," "good." They stand for certain things on the human
level. But the things that writers force
them to stand for when they describe events on the level of eternity are quite
different. Hence the use of them merely
confuses the issue. They just make it
all but impossible for anyone to know what's being talked about. And, meanwhile, you must remember that these
words from the language of everyday life aren't the only troublemakers. People who write about experiences on the
level of eternity also make use of technical phrases borrowed from various
systems of philosophy.'
'Isn't
that your algebra of spiritual experience?' said Pete. 'Isn't that the special, scientific language
you've been talking about?'
'It's
an attempt at such an algebra,' Mr Propter
answered. 'But,
unfortunately, a very unsuccessful attempt. Unsuccessful because this
particular algebra is derived from the language of metaphysics - bad
metaphysics, incidentally. The
people who use it are committing themselves, whether they like it or not, to an
explanation of the facts as well as a description. An explanation of actual experiences in terms
of metaphysical entities, whose existence is purely
hypothetical and can't be demonstrated.
In other words, they're describing the facts in terms of figments of the
imagination; they're explaining the known in terms of the unknown. Take a few examples. Here's one: "ecstasy." It's a technical term that refers to the
soul's ability to stand outside the body - and of course it carries the further
implication that we know what the soul is and how it's related to the body and the rest of the
universe. Or take another instance, a
technical term that is essential to the Catholic theory of mysticism:
"infused contemplation." Here
the implication is that there's somebody outside us who pours a certain kind of
psychological experience into our minds.
The further implication is that we know who that somebody is. Or consider even "union with
God." What it means depends on the
upbringing of the speaker. It may mean
"union with the Jehovah of the Old Testament." Or it may mean "union with the personal
deity of orthodox Christianity." It
may mean what it probably would have meant, say, to Eckhart,
"union with the impersonal Godhead of which the
God of orthodoxy is an aspect and a particular limitation." Similarly, if you were an Indian, it may mean
"union with Isvara" or "union with
Brahman." In every case, the term
implies a previous knowledge about the nature of things which are either
completely unknowable, or at best only to be inferred from the nature of the
experiences which the term is supposed to describe. So there,' Mr Propter
concluded, 'you have the second horn of the dilemma - the horn on which all
those who use the current religious vocabulary to describe their experiences on
the level of eternity inevitably impale themselves.'
'And the way between the horns?' Jeremy questioned. 'Isn't it the way of the professional
psychologists who have written about mysticism?
They've evolved a pretty sensible language. You haven't mentioned them.'
'I
haven't mentioned them,' said Mr Propter, 'for the
same reason as in talking about beauty I shouldn't mention professional
aestheticians who had never been inside a picture gallery.'
'You
mean, they don't know what they're talking about?'
Mr
Propter smiled.
'I'd put it another way,' he said.
'They talk about what they know.
But what they know isn't worth talking about. For what they know is only the literature of
mysticism - not the experience.'
'Then
there's no way between the horns,' Jeremy concluded. His eyes twinkled behind his spectacles; he
smiled like a child, taking a sly triumph in some small consummation of
naughtiness. 'What fun it is when there
isn't a way between!' he went on. 'It
makes the world seem so deliciously cosy, when all the issues are barred and
there's nowhere to go to with all your brass bands and shining armour. Onward Christian soldiers! Forward, the Light Brigade! Excelsior!
And all the time you're just going round and round - head to tail,
follow-my-fuehrer - like Fabre's caterpillars. That really gives me a great deal of
pleasure!'
This
time Mr Propter laughed outright. 'I'm sorry to have to disappoint you,' he
said. 'But unfortunately there is a way
between the horns. The
practical way. You can go and
find out what it means for yourself, by first-hand
experience. Just as you can find out
what El Greco's "Crucifixion of St Peter" looks like by taking the
elevator and going up to the hall. Only,
in this case, I'm afraid, there isn't any elevator. You have to go up on your own legs. And make no mistakes,' he added, turning to
Pete, 'there's an awful lot of stairs.'
Dr
Obispo straightened himself up, took the tubes of the stethoscope out of his
ears and stowed the instrument away in his pocket along with the Cent-Vingt Jours de Sodome.
'Anything bad?' Mr Stoyte asked
anxiously.
Dr
Obispo shook his head and gave him a smile of reassurance. 'No influenza anyhow,' he said. 'Just a slight
intensification of the bronchial condition. I'll give you something for it tonight before
you go to bed.'
Mr
Stoyte's face relaxed into cheerfulness. 'Glad it was only a false alarm,' he said,
and turned away to get his clothes which were lying in a heap on the sofa,
under the Watteau.
From
her seat at the soda-counter,
Uncle
Jo grinned triumphantly and slapped his chest so hard that its hairy, almost
female accumulation of flesh shivered like jellies under the blow. 'Nothing wrong we me,' he boasted.
'Well,
Baby,' said Mr Stoyte, as he did up the last button
of his waistcoat. 'You're not saying
much, are you? A penny
for your thoughts.'