literary transcript

 

III

 

Over-organization

 

The shortest and broadest road to the nightmare of Brave New World leads, as I have pointed out, through overpopulation and the accelerating increase of human numbers - twenty-eight hundred millions today, fifty-five hundred millions by the turn of the century, with most of humanity facing the choice between anarchy and totalitarian control.  But the increasing pressure of numbers upon available resources is not the only force propelling us in the direction of totalitarianism.  This blind biological enemy of freedom is allied with immensely powerful forces generated by the very advances in technology of which we are most proud.  Justifiably proud, it may be added; for these advances are the fruits of genius and persistent hard work, of logic, imagination and self-denial - in a word, of moral and intellectual virtues for which one can feel nothing but admiration.  But the Nature of Things is such that nobody in this world ever gets anything for nothing.  These amazing and admirable advances have to be paid for.  Indeed, like last year's washing machine, they are still being paid for - and each instalment is higher than the last.  Many historians, many sociologists and psychologists have written at length, and with deep concern, about the price that Western man has had to pay and will go on paying for technological progress.  They point out, for example, that democracy can hardly be expected to flourish in societies where political and economic power is being progressively concentrated and centralized.  But the progress of technology has led and is still leading to just such concentration and centralization of power.  As the machinery of mass production is made more efficient it tends to become more complex and more expensive - and so less available to the enterpriser of limited means.  Moreover, mass production cannot work without mass distribution; but mass distribution raises problems which only the largest producers can satisfactorily solve.  In a world of mass production and mass distribution the Little Man, with his inadequate stock of working capital, is at a grave disadvantage.  In competition with the Big Man, he loses his money and finally his very existence as an independent producer; the Big Man has gobbled him up.  As the Little Men disappear, more and more economic power comes to be wielded by fewer and fewer people.  Under a dictatorship the Big Business, made possible by advancing technology and the consequent ruin of Little Business, is controlled by the State - that is to say, by a small group of party leaders and the soldiers, policemen and civil servants who carry out their orders.  In a capitalist democracy, such as the United States, it is controlled by what Professor C. Wright Mills has called the Power Elite.  This Power Elite directly employs several millions of the country's working force in its factories, offices and stores, controls many millions more by lending them money to buy its products, and, through its ownership of the media of mass communication, influences the thoughts, the feelings and the actions of virtually everybody.  To parody the words of Winston Churchill, never have so many been manipulated so much by so few.  We are far indeed from Jefferson's ideal of a genuinely free society composed of a hierarchy of self-governing units - 'the elementary republics of the wards, the county republics, the State republics and the Republic of the Union, forming a gradation of authorities.'

      We see, then, that modern technology has led to the concentration of economic and political power, and to the development of a society controlled (ruthlessly in the totalitarian states, politely and inconspicuously in the democracies) by Big Business and Big Government.  But societies are composed of individuals and are good only insofar as they help individuals to realize their potentialities and to lead a happy and fruitful life.  How have individuals been affected by the technological advances of recent years?  Here is the answer to this question given by a philosopher-psychiatrist, Dr Erich Fromm:

      'Our contemporary Western society, in spite of its material, intellectual and political progress, is increasingly less conducive to mental health, and tends to undermine the inner security, happiness, reason and the capacity for love in the individual; it tends to turn him into an automaton who pays for his human failure with increasing mental sickness, and with despair hidden under a frantic drive for work and so-called pleasure.'

      Our 'increasing mental sickness' may find expression in neurotic symptoms.  These symptoms are conspicuous and extremely distressing.  But 'let us beware', says Dr Fromm, 'of defining mental hygiene as the prevention of symptoms.  Symptoms as such are not our enemy, but our friend; where there are symptoms there is conflict, and conflict always indicates that the forces of life which strive for integration and happiness are still fighting.'  The really hopeless victims of mental illness are to be found among those who appear to be most normal.  'Many of them are normal because they are so well adjusted to our mode of existence, because their human voice has been silenced so early in their lives, that they do not even struggle or suffer or develop symptoms as the neurotic does.'  They are normal not in what may be called the absolute sense of the word; they are normal only in relation to a profoundly abnormal society.  Their perfect adjustment to that abnormal society is a measure of their mental sickness.  These millions of abnormally normal people, living without fuss in a society to which, if they were fully human beings, they ought not to be adjusted, still cherish 'the illusion of individuality', but in fact they have been to a great extent de-individualized.  Their conformity is developing into something like uniformity.  But 'uniformity and freedom are incompatible.  Uniformity and mental health are incompatible too ... Man is not made to be an automaton, and if he becomes one, the basis for mental health is destroyed.'

      In the course of evolution nature has gone to endless trouble to see that every individual is unlike every other individual.  We reproduce our kind by bringing the father's genes into contact with the mother's.  These hereditary factors may be combined in an almost infinite number of ways.  Physically and mentally, each one of us is unique.  And culture which, in the interests of efficiency or in the name of some political or religious dogma, seeks to standardize the human individual, commits an outrage against man's biological nature.

      Science may be defined as the reduction of multiplicity to unity.  It seeks to explain the endlessly diverse phenomena of nature by ignoring the uniqueness of particular events, concentrating on what they have in common and finally abstracting some kind of 'law', in terms of which they make sense and can be effectively dealt with.  As examples, applies fall from the tree and the moon moves across the sky.  People had been observing these facts from time immemorial.  With Gertrude Stein they were convinced that an apple is an apple is an apple, whereas the moon is the moon is the moon.  It remained for Isaac Newton to perceive what these very dissimilar phenomena had in common, and to formulate a theory of gravitation in terms of which certain aspects of the behaviour of apples, of the heavenly bodies and indeed of everything else in the physical universe could be explained and dealt with in terms of a single system of ideas.  In the same spirit the artist takes the innumerable diversities and uniquenesses of the outer world and his own imagination and gives them meaning within an orderly system of plastic, literary or musical patterns.  The wish to impose order upon confusion, to bring harmony out of dissonance and unity out of multiplicity, is a kind of intellectual instinct, a primary and fundamental urge of the mind.  Within the realms of science, art and philosophy the workings of what I may call this 'Will to Order' are mainly beneficent.  True, the Will to Order has produced many premature syntheses based upon insufficient evidence, many absurd systems of metaphysics and theology, much pedantic mistaking of notions for realities, of symbols and abstractions for the data of immediate experience.  But these errors, however regrettable, do not do much harm, at any rate directly - though it sometimes happens that bad philosophical systems may do harm indirectly, by being used as justification for senseless and inhuman actions.  It is in the social sphere, in the realm of politics and economics, that the Will of Order becomes really dangerous.

      Here the theoretical reduction of unmanageable multiplicity to comprehensible unity becomes the practical reduction of human diversity to subhuman uniformity, of freedom to servitude.  In politics the equivalent of a fully developed scientific theory or philosophical system is a totalitarian dictatorship.  In economics, the equivalent of a beautifully composed work of art is the smoothly running factory in which the workers are perfectly adjusted to the machines.  The Will to Order can make tyrants out of those who merely aspire to clear up a mess.  The beauty of tidiness is used as a justification for despotism.

      Organization is indispensable; for liberty arises and has meaning only within a self-regulating community of freely cooperating individuals.  But, though indispensable, organization can also be fatal.  Too much organization transforms men and women into automata, suffocates the creative spirit and abolishes the very possibility of freedom.  As usual, the only safe course is in the middle, between the extremes of laissez-faire at one end of the scale and of total control at the other.

      During the past century the successive advances in technology have been accompanied by corresponding advances in organization.  Complicated machinery has had to be matched by complicated social arrangements, designed to work as smoothly and efficiently as the new instruments of production.  In order to fit into these organizations, individuals have had to de-individualize themselves, have had to deny their native diversity and conform to a standard pattern, have had to do their best to become automata.

      The dehumanizing effects of over-organization are reinforced by the dehumanizing effects of overpopulation.  Industry, as it expands, draws an ever greater proportion of humanity's increasing numbers into large cities.  But life in large cities is not conducive to mental health (the highest incidence of schizophrenia, we are told, occurs among the swarming inhabitants of industrial slums); nor does it foster the kind of responsible freedom within small self-governing groups, which is the first condition of a genuine democracy.  City life is anonymous and, as it were, abstract.  People are related to one another, not as total personalities, but as the embodiments of economic functions or, when they are not at work, as irresponsible seekers of entertainment.  Subjected to this kind of life, individuals tend to feel lonely and insignificant.  Their existence ceases to have any point or meaning.

      Biologically speaking, man is a moderately gregarious, not a completely social, animal - a creature more like a wolf, let us say, or an elephant, than like a bee or an ant.  In their original form human societies bore no resemblance to the hive or the ant heap; they were merely packs.  Civilization is, among other things, the process by which primitive packs are transformed into an analogue, crude and mechanical, of the social insects' organic communities.  At the present time the pressures of overpopulation and technological changes are accelerating this process.  The termitary has come to seem a realizable and even, in some eyes, a desirable ideal.  Needless to say, the ideal will never in fact be realized.  A great gulf separates the social insects from the not too gregarious, big-brained mammal; and even though the mammal should do his best to imitate the insect, the gulf would remain.  However hard they try, men cannot create a social organism, they can only create an organization.  In the process of trying to create an organism they will merely create a totalitarian despotism.

      Brave New World presents a fanciful and somewhat ribald picture of a society, in which the attempt to recreate human beings in the likeness of termites has been pushed almost to the limits of the possible.  That we are being propelled in the direction of Brave New World is obvious.  But no less obvious is the fact that we can, if we so desire, refuse to cooperate with the blind forces that are propelling us.  For the moment, however, the wish to resist does not seem to be very strong or very widespread.  As Mr William Whyte has shown in his remarkable book, The Organization Man, a new Social Ethic is replacing our traditional ethical system - the system in which the individual is primary.  The key words in this Social Ethic are 'adjustment', 'adaptation', 'socially orientated behaviour', 'belongingness', 'acquisition of social skills', 'team work', 'group living', 'group loyalty', 'group dynamics', 'group thinking', 'group creativity'.  Its basic assumption is that the social whole has greater worth and significance than its individual parts, that inborn biological differences should be sacrificed  to cultural uniformity, that the rights of the collectivity should take precedence over what the eighteenth century called the Rights of Man.  According to the Social Ethic, Jesus was completely wrong in asserting that the Sabbath was made for man.  On the contrary, man was made for the Sabbath, and must sacrifice his inherited idiosyncrasies and pretend to be the kind of standardized good mixer that organizers of group activity regard as ideal for their purposes.  This ideal man is the man who displays 'dynamic conformity' (delicious phrase!) and an intense loyalty to the group, an unflagging desire to subordinate himself, to belong.  And the ideal man must have an ideal wife, highly gregarious, infinitely adaptable and not merely resigned to the fact that her husband's first loyalty is to the Corporation, but actively loyal on her own account.  'He for God only,' as Milton said of Adam and Eve, 'she for God in him.'  And in one important respect the wife of the ideal organization man is a good deal worse off than our First Mother.  She and Adam were permitted by the Lord to be completely uninhibited in the matter of 'youthful dalliance'.

 

                                             Nor turned, I ween,

                                             Adam from his fair spouse, nor Eve the rites

                                             Mysterious of connubial love refused

 

Today, according to the writer in the Harvard Business Review, the wife of the man who is trying to live up to the ideal proposed by the Social Ethics, 'must not demand too much of her husband's time and interest.  Because of his single-minded concentration on his job, even his sexual activity must be relegated to a secondary place.'  The monk makes vows of poverty, obedience and chastity.  The organization man is allowed to be rich, but promises obedience ('he accepts authority without resentment, he looks up to his superiors' - Mussolini ha sempre ragione) and he must be prepared, for the greater glory of the organization that employs him, to forswear even conjugal love. [Under Mao Tse-tung these capitalistic counsels of perfection have become commandments and been modified as regulations.  In the new People's Communes the conjugal state has been abolished.  That there may be no mutual tenderness, husbands and wives are housed in separate barracks and are permitted to sleep together (for a brief hour or two, like prostitutes and their clients) only on alternate Saturday nights.]

      It is worth remarking that, in 1984, the members of the Party are compelled to conform to a sexual ethic of more than Puritan severity.  In Brave New World, on the other hand, all are permitted to indulge their sexual impulses without let or hindrance.  The society described in Orwell's fable is a society permanently at war, and the aim of its rulers is first, of course, to exercise power for its own delightful sake, and second, to keep their subjects in that state of constant tension which a state of constant war demands of those who wage it.  By crusading against sexuality the bosses are able to maintain the required tension in their lust for power in a most gratifying way.  The society described in Brave New World is a world-state in which war has been eliminated and where the first aim of rulers is at all cost to keep their subjects from making trouble.  This they achieve by (among other methods) legalizing a degree of sexual freedom (made possible by the abolition of the family) that practically guarantees the Brave New Worlders against any form of destructive (or creative) emotional tension.  In 1984 the lust for power is satisfied by inflicting pain; in Brave New World, by inflicting a hardly less humiliating pleasure.

      The current Social Ethic, it is obvious, is merely a justification after the fact of the less desirable consequences of over-organization.  It represents a pathetic attempt to make a virtue of necessity, to extract a positive value from an unpleasant datum.  It is a very unrealistic, and therefore very dangerous, system of morality.  The social whole, whose value is assumed to be greater than that of its component parts, is not an organism in the sense that a hive or a termitary may be thought of as an organism.  It is merely an organization, a piece of social machinery.  There can be no value except in relation to life and awareness.  An organization is neither conscious nor alive.  Its value is instrumental and derivative.  It is not good in itself; it is good only to the extent that it promotes the good of the individuals who are the parts of the collective whole.  To give organizations precedence over persons is to subordinate ends to means. What happens when ends are subordinated to means was clearly demonstrated by Hitler and Stalin.  Under their hideous rule personal ends were subordinated to organizational means by a mixture of violence and propaganda, systematic terror and the systematic manipulation of minds.  In the more efficient dictatorship of tomorrow there will probably be much less violence than under Hitler and Stalin.  The future dictator's subjects will be painlessly regimented by a corps of highly trained Social engineers.  'The challenge of social engineering in our time,' writes an enthusiastic advocate of this new science, 'is like the challenge of technical engineering fifty years ago.  If the first half of the twentieth century was the era of the technical engineers, the second half may well be the era of the social engineers' - and the twenty-first century, I suppose, will be the era of World Controllers, the scientific caste system and Brave New World.  To the question quis custodiet custodes? - who will mount guard over our guardians, who will engineer the engineers? - the answer is a bland denial that they need any supervision.  There seems to be a touching belief among certain Ph.D.s in sociology that Ph.D.s in sociology will never be corrupted by power.  Like Sir Galahad's, their strength is as the strength of ten because they are scientists and have taken six thousand hours of social studies.

      Alas, higher education is not necessarily a guarantee of higher virtue, or higher political wisdom.  And to these misgivings on ethical and psychological grounds must be added misgivings of a purely scientific character.  Can we accept the theories on which the social engineers base their practice, and in terms of which they justify their manipulations of human beings?  For example, Professor Elton Mayo tells us categorically that 'man's desire to be continually associated in work with his fellows is a strong, if not the strongest human characteristic'.  This, I would say, is manifestly untrue.  Some people have the kind of desire described by Mayo; others do not.  It is a matter of temperament and inherited constitution.  And social organization based upon the assumption that 'man' (whoever 'man' may be) desires to be continuously associated with his fellows would be, for many individual men and women, a bed of Procrustes.  Only by being amputated or stretched upon a rack could they be adjusted to it.

      Again, how romantically misleading are the lyrical accounts of the Middle Ages, with which many contemporary theorists of social relations adorn their works!  'Membership in a guild, manorial estate or village protected medieval man throughout his life and gave him peace and serenity.'  Protected him from what, we may ask?  Certainly not from remorseless bullying at the hands of his superiors.  And along with all that 'peace and serenity' there was, throughout the Middle Ages, an enormous amount of chronic frustration, acute unhappiness and a passionate resentment against the rigid, hierarchical system that permitted no vertical movement up the social ladder and, for those who were bound to the land, very little horizontal movement in space.  The impersonal forces of overpopulation and over-organization, and the social engineers who are trying to direct these forces, are pushing us in the direction of a new medieval system.  This revival will be made more acceptable than the original by such Brave-New-Worldian amenities as infant conditioning, sleep teaching and drug-induced euphoria; but, for the majority of men and women, it will still be a kind of servitude.