literary transcript

 

 

CHAPTER XXVIII

 

June 25th 1934

 

The facility with which one could become a Stiggins in modern dress!  A much subtler, and therefore more detestable, more dangerous Stiggins.  For of course Stiggins himself was too stupid to be either intrinsically very bad or capable of doing much harm to other people.  Whereas if I set my mind to it, heaven knows what I mightn't achieve in the way of lies in the soul.  Even with not setting my mind to it, I could go far – as I perceived, to my horror, today, when I found myself talking to Purchas and three or four of his young people.  Talking about Miller's 'anthropological approach'; talking about peace as a way of life as well as an international policy – the way of life being the condition of any policy that had the least hope of being permanently successful.  Talking so clearly, so profoundly, so convincingly.  (The poor devils were listening with their tongues hanging out.)  Much more convincingly than Purchas himself could have done; that muscular-jocular-Christian style starts by being effective, but soon makes hearers feel that they're being talked down to.  What they like is that the speaker should be thoroughly serious, but comprehensible.  Which is a trick I happen to possess.  There I was, discoursing in a really masterly way about the spiritual life, and taking intense pleasure in that mastery, secretly congratulating myself on being not only so clever, but also so good – when all at once I realized who I was: Stiggins.  Talking about the theory of courage, self-sacrifice, patience, without any knowledge of the practice.  Talking, moreover, in the presence of people who had practised what I was preaching – preaching so effectively that the proper roles were reversed: they were listening to me, not I to them.  The discovery of what I was doing came suddenly.  I was overcome with shame.  And yet – more shameful – went on talking.  Not for long, however.  A minute or two, and I simply had to stop, apologize, insist that it wasn't my business to talk.

      This shows how easy it is to be Stiggins by mistake and unconsciously.  But also that unconsciousness is no excuse, and that one's responsible for the mistake, which arises, of course, from the pleasure one takes in being more talented than other people and in dominating them by means of those talents.  Why is one unconscious?  Because one hasn't ever taken the trouble to examine one's motives; and one doesn't examine one's motives, because one's motives are mostly discreditable.  Alternatively, of course, one examines one's motives, but tells oneself lies about them till one comes to believe that they're good.  Which is the conviction of the self-conscious Stiggins.  I've always condemned showing off and the desire to dominate as vulgar, and imagined myself pretty free of these vulgarities.  But insofar as free at all, I now perceive, only thanks to the indifference which has kept me away from other people, thanks to the external-economic and internal-intellectual circumstances which made me a sociologist rather than a banker, administrator, engineer, working in direct contact with my fellows.  Not to make contacts, I have realized, is wrong; but the moment I make them, I catch myself showing off and trying to dominate.  Showing off, to make it worse, as Stiggins would have done, trying to dominate by a purely verbal display of virtues which I don't put into practice.  Humiliating to find that one's supposed good qualities are mainly due to circumstances and the bad habit of indifference, which make me shirk occasions for behaving badly – or well, for that matter, seeing that it's very difficult to behave either well or badly except towards other people.  More humiliating still to find that when, with an effort of goodwill, one creates the necessary opportunities, one immediately responds to them by behaving badly.  Note: meditate on the virtues that are the contraries of vanity, lust for power, hypocrisy.