ROUSSEAU

 

NOTHING is more clear than that the enjoyment of art and letters is forbidden, in any rich and subtle degree, to the apprehension of the moralist.  It is also forbidden, for quite other reasons, to the apprehension of the extravagantly vicious.

      The moralist is debarred from any free and passionate love of literature by the simple fact that all literature is created out of the vices of men of letters.  The extravagantly vicious man is debarred from such a love by the still simpler fact that his own dominant obsession narrows down his interest to the particular writers who share his own vice.

      When I encounter a catholic and impassioned lover of books - of many books and many authors - I know two things about him - I know that he is the opposite of a moralist, and I know that he is free from any maniacal vice.  I might go further and say that I know he has a rooted hatred of moralists and a tolerant curiosity about every other form of human aberration.

      When I say that literature is created out of the vices of men of letters, I use the word in a large and liberal sense.  A vice is a pleasant sensation condemned by Puritans.  It is an overemphasis laid upon some normal reaction; or it is a perverse and morbid deviation from the normal path.

      It would not require any fantastic stretch of psychological interpretation to show how all the great men of letters are driven forward along their various paths by some demoniac urge, some dynamic impulse, that has its sensual as well as its intellectual origin.  The "psychology of genius" is still in its infancy.  It seems a pity that so much of the critical interpretation of the great writers of the world should be in the hands of persons who - by reason of their academic profession - are naturally more interested in the effect of such work upon youthful minds than in its intrinsic quality.

      The barbaric vulgarity of our commercial age is largely responsible for the invidious slur cast upon any genuine critical psychology; upon any psychology which frankly recognises the enormous influence in literature exercised by normal or abnormal sexual impulses.

      Criticism of literature which has nothing to say about the particular sexual impulse - natural or vicious, as it may happen - which drives a writer forward, becomes as dull and unenlightening as theology without the Real Presence.

      Among the influences that obstruct such free criticism among us at present may be noted Puritan fanaticism, academic professionalism (with its cult of the "young person"), popular vulgarity, and that curious Anglo-Saxon uneasiness and reticence in these things which while in no sense a sigh of purity of mind invokes an invincible prejudice against any sort of straightforward discussion.

      It is for these reasons that the art of criticism in England and America is so childish and pedantic when compared with that of France.  In France even the most reactionary of critics - persons like Léon Bloy, for instance - habitually use the boldest sexual psychology in elucidating the mysterious caprices of human genius; and one can only wish that the conventional inhibition that renders such freedom impossible with us could come to be seen in its true light, that is to say as itself one of the most curious examples of sexual morbidity ever produced by unnatural conditions.

      Rousseau is perhaps of all great original geniuses the one most impossible to deal with without some sort of recognition of the sexual peculiarities which penetrated his passionate and restless spirit.  No writer who has ever lived had so sensitive, so nervous, so vibrant a psychological constitution.  Nothing that he achieved in literature or in the creation of a new atmosphere of feeling in Europe, can be understood without at least a passing reference to the impulses which pushed him forward on his wayward road.

      As we watch him in his pleasures, his passions, his pilgrimages, his savage reactions, it is difficult to avoid the impression that certain kinds of genius are eminently and organically anti-social.

      It is perhaps for this reason at bottom that the political-minded Anglo-Saxon race, with its sturdy "good citizen" ideals, feels so hostile and suspicious towards these great anarchists of the soul.

      Rousseau is indeed, temperamentally considered, one of the most passionately anarchical minds in the history of the race.  The citizen of Geneva, the lover of humanity, the advocate of liberty and equality, was so scandalous an individualist that there has come to breathe from the passage of his personality across the world an intoxicating savour of irresponsible independence.

      The most ingrained pursuer of his own path, the most intransigent "enemy of the people", would be able to derive encouragement in his obstinate loneliness from reading the works of this philanthropist who detested humanity; this reformer who fled from society; this advocate of domesticity who deserted his children; this pietist who worshipped the god of nature.

      The man's intellect was so dominated by his sensualism that, even at the moment he is eloquently protesting in favour of a regenerated humanity living under enlightened laws, there emanates from the mere physical rhythm of his sentences an anti-social passion, a misanthropic self-worship, a panic terror of the crowd, which remains in the mind when all his social theories are forgotten.

      He is the grand example of a writer whose subconscious intimate self contradicts his overt dogmas and creates a spiritual atmosphere in which his own reforming schemes wither and vanish.

      Rousseau is, from any moral or social or national point of view, a force of much more disintegrating power than Nietzsche can ever be. And he is this for the very reason that his sensual and sentimental nature dominates him so completely.

      Fro the austere Nietzschean watchtower, this man's incorrigible weakness presents itself as intrinsically more dangerous to the race than any unscrupulous strength.  The voluptuous femininity of his insidious eloquence lends itself, as Nietzsche saw, to every sort of crafty hypocrisy.

      Rousseau's rich, subtle, melodious style - soft as a voice of a choir of women celebrating some Euripidean Dionysus - flows round the revolutionary figure of Liberty with an orgiastic passion worthy of the backward flung heads, bared breasts and streaming hair of a dance of Bassarids.

      Other symbolic figures besides that of Liberty emerge above the stream of this impassioned "Return to Nature".  The figure of justice is there and the figure of fraternity; while above them all the shadowy lineaments of some female personification of the Future of Humanity, crowned with the happy stars of the Age of Gold, looks down upon the rushing tide.

      "Oh, Liberty!" one can hear the voice of many heroic souls protesting, "Oh, Liberty - what things are done in thy name!"

      For it is of the essential nature of Rousseau's eloquence, as it is of the essential nature of his temperament, that any kind of sensual abandonment, slurred over by rich orchestral litanies of human freedom, should be more than tolerated.

      This Religion of Liberty lends itself to strange hypocrisies when the torrent of his imaginative passion breaks upon the jagged rocks of reality.  That is why - from Robespierre down to very modern persons - the eloquent use of such vague generalisations as Justice, Virtue, Simplicity, Nature, Humanity, Reason, excites profound suspicion in the psychological mind.

      From the antinomian torrent of this voluptuous anarchy the spirits of Epicurus, of Spinoza, of Goethe, of Nietzsche, turn away in horror.  This is indeed an insurrection from the depths; this is indeed a breaking loose of chaos; this is indeed a "return to Nature".  For there is a perilous intoxication in all this, and, like chemical ingredients in some obsessing drug, these great vague names work magically and wantonly upon us, giving scope to all our weaknesses and perversities.

      If I were asked - taking all the great influences which have moulded human history together - what figure, what personality, I would set up as the antipodal antagonist of the influence of Nietzsche, I would retort with the name of Rousseau.

      Here is an "immoralism" deeper and far more anti-social than any "beyond good and evil".  Nietzsche hammered furiously at Christian ethics; but he did so with the sublime intention of substituting for what he destroyed a new ethical construction of his own.

      Rousseau, using with stirring and caressing unction symbol after symbol, catchword after catchword, from the moral atmosphere of Christendom, draws us furiously after him, in a mad hysterical abandonment of all that every human symbol covers, towards a cataract of limitless and almost inhuman subjectivity.

      To certain types of mind Rousseau appears as a noble prophet of what is permanent in evangelical "truth" and of what is desirable and lovely in the future of humanity.  To other types - to the pronounced classical or Goethean type, for instance - he must appear as the most pernicious, the most disintegrating, the most poisonous, the most unhealthy influence that has ever been brought to bear upon the world.  Such minds - confronting him with a genuine and logical anarchist, such as Max Stirner - would find him far more dangerous.  For Rousseau's anarchy is of an emotional, psychological, feminine kind; a kind that carries along upon the surface of its eloquence every sort of high-sounding abstraction; while, all the time, the sinuous waters of its world-sapping current filter through all the floodgates of human intuition.

      One cannot but be certain that Rousseau would have been one of those irresistible but most injurious persons whom, honourably crowned with fillets of well-spun wool and fresh-grown myrtle, Plato would have dismissed from the gates of the great Republic.

      One asks oneself the question - and it is a question less often asked than one would expect - whether it is really possible that a man of immense genius and magnetic influence can actually, as the phrase runs, "do more harm than good" to the happiness of the human race.  We are so absurdly sheep-like and conventional in these things that we permit our old-fashioned belief in a benignant providence turning all things to good, to transform itself into a vague optimistic trust in evolutionary progress; a progress which can never for one moment fail to make everything work out to the advantage of humanity.

      We have such pathetic trust too in the inherent friendliness of the universe that it seems inconceivable to us that a great genius, inspired from hidden cosmic depths, should be actually a power of evil, dangerous to humanity.  And yet, why not?  Why should there not appear sometimes from the secret reservoirs of Being, powerful and fatal influences that, in the long result, are definitely baleful and malign in their effect upon the fortunes of the human race?

      This was the underlying belief in the Middle Ages, and it led to the abominable persecution of persons who were obviously increasing the sum of human happiness.  But may not there have been behind such unpardonable persecution, a legitimate instinct of self-protection - an instinct for which in these latter days of popular worship of "great names" there is no outlet of expression?

      The uneasiness of the modern English-speaking world in the presence of free discussion of sex is, of course, quite a different matter.  This objection is a mere childish prejudice reinforced by outworn superstitions.  The religious terror elicited by certain formidable free-thinkers and anti-social philosophers in earlier days went much deeper than this, and was quite free from that mere prurient itch of perverted sensuality which inspires the Puritans of our time.

      This religious terror, barbarous and hideous as it was in many of its manifestations, may have been a legitimate expression of subconscious panic in the presence of something that, at least now and then, was really antagonistic to the general welfare.

      Why should there not arise sometimes great demonic forces, incarnated in formidable personalities, who are really and truly "humani generis hostes", enemies of the human race?  The weird mediæval dream of the Antichrist, drawn from Apocalyptic literature, symbolises the occult possibility.

      Because a writer has immense genius there is no earthly reason why his influence upon the world should be good.  There is no reason why it should be for the happiness of the world, putting the moral question aside.

      In the classic ages the State regulated literature.  In the Middle Ages, the Church regulated it.  In our own age it is not regulated at all; it is neglected by ignorance and expurgated by stupidity.  The mob in our days cringes before great names, the journalist exploits great names, and the schoolmaster dishes them up for the young.  No-one seriously criticises them; no-one seriously considers their influence upon the world.

      The businessman has a shrewd suspicion that they have no influence at all; or certainly none comparable with that of well-placed advertisements.  Meanwhile under the surface, from sensitive minds to sensitive minds, there run the electric currents of new intellectual ideas, setting in motion those psychic and spiritual forces which still, in spite of all our economic philosophers, upheave the world.

      Was Rousseau, more than anyone, more than Voltaire, more than Diderot, responsible for the French Revolution?  I am inclined to hold that he was, and if so, according to the revolutionary instincts or all enemies of oppression, we are bound to regard his influence as "good"; unless by chance we are among those who consider the tyranny of the middle class no less outrageous than the tyranny of the aristocracy.  But Rousseau's influence - so far-stretching is the power of personal genius - does not stop with the French Revolution.  It does not stop with the Commune or with any other outburst of popular indignation.  It works subterraneanly in a thousand devious ways until the present hour.  Wherever, under the impassioned enthusiasm of such words as Justice, Liberty, Equality, Reason, Nature, Love, self-idealising, self-worshipping, self-deceiving prophets of magnetic genius give way to their weaknesses, their perversities, their anti-social reactions, the vibrant nerves of the great citizen of Geneva may still be felt, quivering melodiously; touching us with the tremulousness of their anarchical revolt against everything hard and stern and strong.

      Suppose for a moment that Rousseau were the equivocal pernicious influence, half-priest, half-pandar, half-charlatan, half-prophet of a world-disintegrating orgy of sentiment, should I for one, I am tempted to ask, close the gates of our platonic republic against him?

      Not so!  Let the world look to itself.  Let the sheep-like crowd take the risks of its docility.  Let the new bourgeois tyrants cuddle and cosset the serpent that shall bite them, as did the salon ladies of the old régime.

      No!  Let the world look to itself and let progress look to itself.

      There seems something exhilarating about this possible appearance upon the earth of genuinely dangerous writers, of writers who exploit their vices, lay bare their weaknesses, brew intoxicating philtres of sweet poison out of their obsessions and lead humanity to the edge of the precipice!  And there is something peculiarly stimulating to one's psychological intelligence when all this is done under the anæsthesia of humanitarian rhetoric and the lulling incantations of pastoral sentiment.

      Rousseau is, in one very important sense, the pioneer of that art of delicate egoism in which the wisest epicureans of our day love to indulge.  I refer to his mania for solitude, his self-conscious passion for nature.  This feeling for nature was absolutely genuine in him and associates itself with all his amours and all his boldest speculations.

      The interesting thing about it is that it takes the form of that vague, intimate magical rapport between our human souls and whatever mysterious soul lurks in the world around us, which has become in these recent days the predominant secret of imaginative poetry.

      Not that Rousseau carries things as far as Wordsworth or Shelley.  He is a born prose writer, not a poet.  But for the very reason that he is writing prose, and writing it with a sentimental rather than a mystical bias, there are aspects of his work which have a simple natural personal appeal that the sublime imagination of the great spiritual poets must necessarily lack.

      There is indeed about Rousseau's allusions to places and spots which had become dear to him from emotional association a lingering regretful tenderness, full of wistful memories and a vague tremulous yearning, which leaves upon the mind a feeling unlike that produced by any other writer.  The subconscious music of his days seems at those times to rise from some hidden wells of emotion in him and overflow the world.

      When he speaks of such places the mere admixture in his tone of the material sensuousness of the eighteen century with something new and thrilling and different has itself an appealing charm.  The blending of a self-conscious artificial, pastoral sentiment, redolent of the sophisticated Arcadias of Poussin and Watteau, and suggestive of the dairymaid masquerades of Marie Antoinette in the gardens of Versailles, with a direct passionate simplicity almost worthy of some modern Russian, produces a unique and memorable effect upon a sympathetic spirit.

      The mere fact that the incorrigible egoist and introspective epicurean, William Hazlitt, whose essays are themselves full of an ingratiating and engaging sensuousness, should have taken Rousseau as his special master and idealised him into a symbolic figure, is a proof of the presence in him of something subtle, arresting and unusual.

      I always like to bring these recondite odours and intimations of delicate spiritual qualities down to the test of actual experience, and I am able to say that, through the help of Hazlitt's intuitive commentaries, the idea of Rousseau has twined itself around some of the pleasantest recollections of my life.

      I can see at this moment as I pen these lines, a certain ditch-bordered path leading to a narrow footbridge across a river in Norfolk.  I can recall the indescribable sensations which the purple spikes of loosestrife and the tall willow-herb, growing with green rushes, produced in my mind on a certain misty morning when the veiled future bowed towards me like a vision of promise, and the dead past flew away over the fens like a flight of wild swans.

      The image of Rousseau cherishing so tenderly every rose-tinged memory and every leafy oasis in his passionate pilgrimage, came to me then, as it comes to me now, a thing that no harsh blows of the world, no unkind turns of fate, no "coining of my soul for drachmas" can ever quite destroy.

      There is, after all, a sort of spiritual second self, a sort of astral residuum left behind by a personality of this kind, which to certain natures becomes more sacred and suggestive than any of those tedious speculations or literary theories about which the historians may argue.

      Must human beings - especially in these "centres of civilisation", which are more hideous than anything the sun has looked upon since it watched the mammoths tusking the frozen earth or the ichtheosauruses wallowing in the primeval mud - go through this life blindly, mechanically, unconsciously, fulfilling their duties, snatching at their pleasures, and shuddering at the thought of the end.

      Few men and women seem really conscious of what it is to be alive, to be alive and endowed with imagination and memory, upon this time-battered planet.  It needs perhaps the anti-social instincts of a true "philosophic anarchist" to detach oneself from the absorbing present and to win the larger perspective.

      Rousseau was of so fluid, so irresponsible a temperament that he never could be brought to take seriously, to take as anything but as suggestive subjects for eloquent diatribes, the practical and domestic relations between human beings in organised society.

      He played lightly with these relations, he laughed over them and wept over them, he wrote impassioned and dithyrambic orations upon them.  But they were not his real life.  His real life was the life he lived with his music and his botany and his love affairs, the life of his dreamy wanderings from refuge to refuge among the woods and châteaux of France; the life of his delicate memories and wistful regrets; the life of his thrilling indescribable thoughts, half sensual and half spiritual, as he drifted along the lonely roads and under the silent stars, or sat staring at the firelight in his Paris attic while the city roared about him.

      No lonely introspective spirit, withdrawn from the crowd and hating the voices of the world, can afford to lose touch with the secret of Rousseau; with what his self-centred and impassioned existence really meant.

      We need not tease ourselves with his pious speculations, with his philanthropic oratory or his educational proposals.  These can be left to those who are interested in such things.  What we find arresting and suggestive in him, after this lapse of years, in a certain quality of personal passion, a certain veil of individual feeling, the touch of which still has a living power.

      How interesting, for example, is that voluptuous desire of his to lay bare all his basest and meanest lusts, all his little tricks and devices and vanities and envies and jealousies.  This mania for self-exposure, this frantic passion for self-laceration and self-humiliation is all of a piece with the manner in which he seemed to enjoy being ill-used and tyrannised over in his singular love-affairs.

      More interesting still, and still more morbid, is that persecution mania which seized him in his later days - the mania that all the world loathed him and laughed at him and plotted to make a fool of him.  Though betrayed into using the popular phrase "persecution mania", I am myself inclined to resent, on Rousseau's behalf and on behalf of those who temperamentally resemble him, this cool assumption by the normal world that those whom it instinctively detests are "mad" when they grow aware of such detestation.

      There seems no doubt that certain human beings appear at intervals on the world stage, whose sentient organisations, attuned to an abnormal receptivity, renders them alien and antagonistic to the masses of mankind.

      They seem like creatures dropped upon the earth from some other planet, and, do what they may, they cannot grow "native and endued into the element" of our terrestrial system.  This difference in them is not only irritating to the normal herd; it is also provocative of bitter hostility in those among their contemporaries who are themselves possessed of genius.

      Those other wooers of posterity feel outraged and piqued to the limit of their endurance at having to contend in the same arena with an antagonist who seems to obey no human rules.  "A conspiracy of silence" or of scandalous aspersions is almost instinctively set on foot.

      Rousseau's so-called mania of persecution can easily be explained.  There was morbidity; there was neurotic unwisdom, in the manner in which he dealt with all these people.  But he was probably perfectly right in assuming that they came to hate him.

      In his Confessions he does his best to make posterity hate him; and in private life he must have been constantly, like one of those strange self-lacerating persons in Dostoievsky, bringing to the front, with shameless indecency, his vanities and jealousies, his weaknesses and his manias.  When he couldn't enjoy the society of some friendly lady - and his friends were nearly always uneasy under the infliction - he poured forth his childish petulances and his rare imaginations on the bosom, so to speak, of society in general; and society in general flung him back in wondering contempt.

      His clever contemporaries would naturally, under the pressure of the moment, concentrate their critical attention upon the weakest part of his genius - that is to say upon his reforming theories and large world-shaking speculations - while the portion of him that interests us now would merely strike them as tiresome and irrelevant.

      He grew more and more lonely as he neared his end.  It might be said that he deserved this fate; he who refused to accept even the responsibility of paternity.  But one cannot resist a certain satisfaction in noting how the high-placed society people who came to visit him as he sat in his attic, copying music for a livelihood, were driven from his door.

      The great Sentimentalist must have had his exquisite memories, even then, as he sat brooding over his dull mechanical work, he whose burning eloquence about Liberty and Justice and Simplicity and Nature was already sowing the seed of the earthquake.

      Queer memories he must have had of his early tramp life through the roads and villages of France; of his conversations with the sceptical Hume among the hills of Derbyshire; of his sweet romantic sojournings in old historic houses, and his strange passions and fatal loves.  But the rarest of his memories must have been of those hours and days when, in the pastoral seclusion of some cherished hiding-place, he let the world go by and sank, among patient leaves and flowers that could not mock him, into his own soul and the soul of nature.

      He has been hugely vituperated by evolutionary philosophers for his mania for the "age of gold" and his disbelief in progress.

      One of his favourite themes that civilisation is a curse and not a blessing excited the derision of his best friends.  Others said that he stole the idea.  But he may be sure that as he copied his daily portion of music with the civilisation of the Salons clamouring unheeded around him, his mind reverted rather to those exquisite moments when he had been happy alone, than to all the triumphs of his genius.

      He was just the type that the world would naturally persecute.  Devoid of any sparkling wit, devoid of any charm of manner, singularly devoid of the least sense of proportion, he lent himself to every sort of social rancour.  He was one of those persons who take themselves seriously, and that, in his world as in the world of our own time, was an unpardonable fault.

      He loved humanity better than men and women.  He loved nature better than humanity.

      He was a man with little sense of humour and with little interest in other men.  He lived for his memories and his dreams, his glimpses and his visions.

      Turning away from all dogmatic creeds, he yet sought God and prayed to him for his mercy.

      Born into a world whose cleverness he dreaded, whose institutions he loathed, whose angers he provoked, whose authorities he scandalised, whose crowds he hated, he went aside "botanizing" and "copying music"; every now and then hurling forth from his interludes of sentimental journeying a rhythmical torrent of eloquent prophecy in which he himself only half believed and of which, quite often, "the idea was stolen".

      In his abnormal receptivity, he was used as a reed for the invisible powers to blow their wild tunes through and to trouble the earth.  He produced one great Revolution, and he may, through the medium of souls like his own, produce another; but all the time his real happiness was in his wanderings by field and hedge and road and lane, by canal side and by riverbank, thinking the vague delicious thoughts and sensuous solitude and dreaming over the dumb quiescence of that mute inanimate background of our days into which, with his exasperated human nerves, he longed to sink and be at rest.