FORMS OF COMPETITION AND CO-OPERATION

 

1.   Further to the above, one could - and indeed should - argue that the kind of dichotomy which exists, in inorganic no less than organic contexts, between the insanity of sensuality (outer sense) and the sanity of sensibility (inner sense) is also commensurate with a distinction between competition and co-operation, so that it would be difficult, to the point of impossible, not to deduce a correlation between competition and insanity on the one hand, and co-operation and sanity on the other hand, whether in negative or positive terms.

 

2.   Certainly competition will be fiercer in inorganic primacy than in organic supremacy, given the negativity of primacy, and one may be sure that objective competition, or competition rooted in a vacuum, will be more competitive than its subjective counterpart.

 

3.   Conversely, co-operation will be less close in inorganic primacy than in organic supremacy, and we can take it that subjective co-operation, or co-operation centred in a plenum, will be more co-operative than its objective counterpart.

 

4.   Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that just as negative competition will be affiliated to inorganic primacy and positive competition to organic supremacy, so the female forms of each mode of competition, being objective, will be more fiercely competitive than their male counterparts, enabling us to distinguish a kind of direct mode of competition (freely extensive) on the one hand from an indirect mode of it (freely intensive) on the other hand, according to whether freedom attaches primarily to the not-self (female) or to the self (male), with straight and curved distinctions respectively.

 

5.   Likewise, there can be no doubt that just as negative co-operation will be affiliated to inorganic primacy and positive co-operation to organic supremacy, so the male forms of each mode of co-operation, being subjective, will be more closely co-operative than their female counterparts, enabling us to distinguish a kind of direct mode of co-operation (boundly intensive) on the one hand from an indirect mode of it (boundly extensive) on the other hand, according to whether binding attaches primarily to the self (male) or to the not-self (female), with curved and straight distinctions respectively.

 

6.   Thus not only will female competition, being objective, be fiercer than its male counterpart, but it will also be at its most competitive in inorganic primacy and at its least (relative to objective criteria) competitive in organic supremacy.

 

7.   Not only will male co-operation, being subjective, be closer than its female counterpart, but it will also be most co-operative in organic supremacy and least (relative to subjective criteria) co-operative in inorganic primacy.

 

8.   If we think in axial terms, i.e. the female axes of space-time objectivity and volume-mass objectivity vis-à-vis the male axes of mass-volume subjectivity and time-space subjectivity, we can broadly distinguish the inorganic forms of each from their organic counterparts on the following disciplinary terms: viz. war and peace in relation to the female axes and sport and dance in relation to the male axes of inorganic primacy, but sex and spirituality in relation to the male axes and art and fecundity in relation to the female axes of organic supremacy.

 

9.   In other words, we shall find a distinction between war and peace on the one hand and sport and dance on the other, in relation to the negativity, overall, of inorganic primacy, but between sex and spirituality on the one hand and art and fecundity on the other, in relation to the positivity, overall, of organic supremacy.

 

10.  Hence not only is there a female/male distinction, embracing both competition and co-operation, between war and peace on the one hand and sport and dance on the other, but war, being objective, will be more fiercely competitive than sport, while dance, being subjective, will be more closely co-operative than peace, or the sensible alternative to war.  Both alike, however, will appertain to the negativity of inorganic primacy.

 

11.  Conversely, not only is there a male/female distinction, embracing both competition and co-operation, between sex and spirituality on the one hand and art and fecundity on the other hand, but sex, being subjective, will be less fiercely competitive than art, while fecundity, being objective, will be less closely co-operative than spirituality.  Both alike, however, will appertain to the positivity of organic supremacy.

 

12.  But of course, in general terms, war will be more competitive than art, and sport more competitive than sex, while, conversely, peace will be less co-operative than fecundity and dance less co-operative than spirituality.  For competition peaks in inorganic primacy, whereas co-operation peaks in organic supremacy.

 

13.  What can be deduced from the forgoing is that just as sanity is preferable, from a male standpoint, to insanity, binding to freedom, so co-operation is preferable to competition, and never more so than in relation to organic supremacy.

 

14.  For while negative co-operation is arguably preferable, from a male standpoint, to negative competition, it can only be inferior to positive co-operation (as dance to spirituality), whether relatively, in the phenomenal context of physical sensibility, or absolutely, in the noumenal context of metaphysical sensibility, as applicable to the brain and the lungs respectively.

 

15.  Whatever people may think, competition is morally wrong (immoral) and co-operation alone morally right, and while barbarism and philistinism will subscribe to the one, whether negatively or positively, or directly negatively (female) and indirectly negatively (male) or indirectly positively (female) and directly positively (male), civilization and culture will always uphold the other, since civilization and culture are symptomatic of sanity and thus of co-operation, and never more so than in relation to organic supremacy.