CYCLE TWENTY-TWO: MODES OF PRIMACY AND SUPREMACY

 

1.   That which devolves, whether in primary or in secondary terms, has reference to nothingness, whereas that which evolves in such terms has reference to somethingness.

 

2.   We can therefore distinguish the primary nothingness of metachemical and chemical devolution from the secondary nothingness of physical and metaphysical devolution, the former mode of nothingness being objective, the latter mode subjective.

 

3.   We can likewise distinguish the primary somethingness of physical and metaphysical evolution from the secondary somethingness of metachemical and chemical evolution, the former mode of somethingness being subjective, the latter mode objective.

 

4.   Since nothingness is divisible between noumenal and phenomenal planes, it follows that primary nothingness, corresponding to the objective axes, will be un-universal (cosmological) in metachemical materialism and impersonal (geological) in chemical realism, whereas secondary nothingness, corresponding to the subjective axes, will be un-universal (cosmological) in metaphysical idealism and impersonal (geological) in physical naturalism.

 

5.   Since somethingness is divisible between phenomenal and noumenal planes, it follows that primary somethingness, corresponding to the objective axes, will be personal in physical naturalism and universal in metaphysical idealism, whereas secondary somethingness, corresponding to the objective axes, will be personal in chemical realism and universal in metachemical materialism.

 

6.   Hence one can speak of primary orders of no-ones and nobodies in relation to the primary nothingness of metachemical objectivity and chemical objectivity, but of secondary orders of no-ones and nobodies in relation to the secondary nothingness of metaphysical subjectivity and physical subjectivity.

 

7.   Likewise, one can speak of primary orders of somebodies and someones in relation to the primary somethingness of physical subjectivity and metaphysical subjectivity, but of secondary orders of somebodies and someones in relation to the secondary somethingness of chemical objectivity and metachemical objectivity.

 

8.   Just as the nothingness of negativity is always associated with contexts of primacy, whether in primary or secondary terms, so the somethingness of positivity always has associations with contexts of supremacy, whether in primary or secondary terms.

 

9.   Beauty and love, corresponding to the secondary mode of noumenal supremacy, are morally inferior to truth and joy, whose correspondence is to the primary mode of noumenal supremacy.

 

10.  Strength and pride, corresponding to the secondary mode of phenomenal supremacy, are morally inferior to knowledge and pleasure, whose correspondence is to the primary mode of phenomenal supremacy.

 

11.  Conversely, ignorance and pain, corresponding to the secondary mode of phenomenal primacy, are (im)morally inferior to weakness and humility, whose correspondence is to the primary mode of phenomenal primacy.

 

12.  Similarly, falsity and woe, corresponding to the secondary mode of noumenal primacy, are (im)morally inferior to ugliness and hatred, whose correspondence is to the primary mode of noumenal primacy.

 

13.  When positive, phenomenal men (masculinity) are as morally superior to phenomenal women (femininity) as noumenal men (submasculinity/supermasculinity) to noumenal women (superfemininity/subfemininity), since there is a contrast, in each case, between primary and secondary orders of supremacy.

 

14.  When negative, phenomenal women (femininity) are as (im)morally superior to phenomenal men (masculinity) as noumenal women (superfemininty/subfemininity) to noumenal men (submasculinity/supermasculinity), since there is a contrast, in each case, between primary and secondary orders of primacy.

 

15.  The sexes are never literally equal, for the female gender is rooted, objectively, in primacy, whereas the male gender is centred, subjectively, in supremacy.

 

16.  Each gender can, however, be bent towards the other, whether with regard, principally, to secondary supremacy for females or to secondary primacy for males.