44
THE
INFERIOR NEGATIVE: Whatever exists in a negative relationship to the positive
component of a duality exists as its inferior, viz. night in relation to day,
illusion in relation to truth, evil in relation to goodness, sadness in
relation to happiness, pain in relation to pleasure, ugliness in relation to
beauty, weakness in relation to strength, etc.
The proof of this, if it isn't already self-evident, can be defined in
one of two ways, depending on the nature of the duality under consideration.
The case, for example, of night in relation
to day brings to our attention the fact that the night is simply a time without
sunlight, a time when one half of the earth has turned away from the sun. Hence the night is quantitatively inferior to
the day because it lacks something that the day possesses - namely
sunlight. The case, however, of pain in
relation to pleasure brings to our attention the difference of quality between
a sensation which is disagreeable and one, by contrast, which is agreeable, the
former being undesirable and hence inferior to the latter.
Thus it can be contended that dualities are
essentially divisible into two categories: those which permit one to judge the
negative component quantitatively inferior to the positive one on account of
its lacking something which the latter possesses and, similarly, those which
permit one to judge the negative component qualitatively inferior to the
positive one on account of its undesirable feeling or sensation value. Examples in the first category include night
in relation to day, silence in relation to sound, darkness in relation to
light, ugliness in relation to beauty, weakness in relation to strength, evil
in relation to good, illusion in relation to
truth. Examples in the second category
include pain in relation to pleasure, sadness in relation to happiness, fear in
relation to hope, hate in relation to love, humility in relation to pride,
dejection in relation to elation, anger in relation to humour. The first category implies objective
phenomena, either internal or external, that we perceive but do not feel. The second category implies subjective
phenomena, either internal or external, that we feel but do not perceive.