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THE INFERIOR NEGATIVE: Whatever exists in a negative relationship to the positive component of a duality exists as its inferior, viz. night in relation to day, illusion in relation to truth, evil in relation to goodness, sadness in relation to happiness, pain in relation to pleasure, ugliness in relation to beauty, weakness in relation to strength, etc.  The proof of this, if it isn't already self-evident, can be defined in one of two ways, depending on the nature of the duality under consideration.

     The case, for example, of night in relation to day brings to our attention the fact that the night is simply a time without sunlight, a time when one half of the earth has turned away from the sun.  Hence the night is quantitatively inferior to the day because it lacks something that the day possesses - namely sunlight.  The case, however, of pain in relation to pleasure brings to our attention the difference of quality between a sensation which is disagreeable and one, by contrast, which is agreeable, the former being undesirable and hence inferior to the latter.

     Thus it can be contended that dualities are essentially divisible into two categories: those which permit one to judge the negative component quantitatively inferior to the positive one on account of its lacking something which the latter possesses and, similarly, those which permit one to judge the negative component qualitatively inferior to the positive one on account of its undesirable feeling or sensation value.  Examples in the first category include night in relation to day, silence in relation to sound, darkness in relation to light, ugliness in relation to beauty, weakness in relation to strength, evil in relation to good, illusion in relation to truth.  Examples in the second category include pain in relation to pleasure, sadness in relation to happiness, fear in relation to hope, hate in relation to love, humility in relation to pride, dejection in relation to elation, anger in relation to humour.  The first category implies objective phenomena, either internal or external, that we perceive but do not feel.  The second category implies subjective phenomena, either internal or external, that we feel but do not perceive.