THE
LITERARY REVOLUTION
Not so long ago Aldous
Huxley was my literary guru, or spiritual guide. I read everything by him that I could lay my
hands on, and read it, for the most part, with considerable pleasure. These days, however, I am no longer the
respectful disciple but rather more the disrespectful rebel, a critic of my
one-time mentor. Like Nietzsche, I have
rebelled against my master and gone my own separate way, dismissing Huxley with
the ease and willingness with which Nietzsche was to dismiss Schopenhauer. To some extent I am a twentieth-century
Nietzsche, a kindred spirit of the author of The Anti-Christ, Beyond Good and
Evil, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, just as, to some extent, Huxley was
a twentieth-century Schopenhauer, a kindred spirit of the author of The
World as Will and Representation, The Parerga and Paralipomena, and
lesser works. There are, of course,
certain differences. But, broadly
speaking, it is possible for me to identify with Nietzsche, and not simply as a
rebel against a former master but, more importantly, as the advocate of a
short-term positivistic attitude to life which radically conflicts with the
long-term spiritual views upheld by both Schopenhauer and Huxley. For they were largely negative in their
advocacy of non-attachment to the world through a form of Buddhist
renunciation. They were pessimistic in
their attitudes to social progress as reflecting the welfare of the masses, the
social collectivity, and were consequently inclined to stress the importance of
personal salvation through individual effort.
They distrusted political means of improving the world and, because they
rebelled against the social collectivity, were obliged to uphold the individual
in the face of large-scale communal effort.
In sum, they were philosophically and politically conservative, if not
reactionary.
Nietzsche, by contrast, was revolutionary, which is why he has
had a much greater influence on the twentieth century than Schopenhauer. Like him, I too am revolutionary, and to the
extent, I hope, of having a greater influence on the twenty-first century than
Huxley will. At present, Huxley is still
regarded as an outstanding writer and thinker, probably the most outstanding
writer and thinker in England of his generation, which is no small
distinction! For England has produced a
fair number of, if not outstanding, then certainly highly-gifted writers and
thinkers this century, both within Huxley's generation and without it,
including Bertrand Russell, D.H. Lawrence, John Cowper Powys, Malcolm
Muggeridge, John Middleton Murray, and Christopher Isherwood. But Huxley does, I believe, deserve a place
apart, if for no other reason than that he concentrated on a type of literature
and philosophy which must rank among the highest types possible.
As a novelist, Huxley was superior to the great majority of
novelists of his time by preferring an approach to the genre which gave far more
importance to theory than to practice, to speculation than to action, to truth
than to illusion - in a phrase, to philosophy than to fiction. He disliked story-telling, which is of course
the traditional or conventional approach to literature, and endeavoured,
especially in his late novels, to grant as much space to philosophical
discussion and speculation as possible.
This, alone, is the mark of a higher type of literature, a type of which
the twentieth century has witnessed the development, and which may be said to
reflect the predominance of the superconscious over the subconscious, in
accordance with its author's degree of spiritual sophistication. To some extent, the environmental shift, over
the past hundred or so years, from the town to the city has contributed to this
change in priorities from illusion to truth, fiction to fact, insofar as the
modern sophisticated city-dweller no longer experiences the sensuous influence
of nature to the same extent as his forebears, and consequently is in a position
to cultivate more spirit. Being cut-off
from nature to a greater extent than ever before, the modern intelligent
city-dweller is less under the sway of subconscious dominion than would
otherwise be the case, and therefore is more disposed towards the
superconscious. In the case of writers,
such a disposition leads to the traditional criteria of literature being
superseded by criteria reflecting a superconscious bias, in which truth, or
something approximating to it, will take the place of illusory fictions, and a
new type of literature, broadly termed philosophical, duly arises.
Now this new literature will only arise, it goes without saying,
from the most intelligent writers, those who are the recipients of a greater
degree of superconscious influence than lesser men, and it will even be
possible for such writers to continue writing in their predominantly
philosophical style whether or not they spend all of their time in the
city. Provided they don't spend too much
time amid the subconsciously-dominated plant world of nature, they are unlikely
to become any-the-less intelligent. For
one can flit from one environment to another, one town or city to another, and
still maintain this higher kind of writing - as, indeed, Aldous Huxley managed
to do, despite a distaste for large cities.
He was, however, too much of a bourgeois, and therefore too fond of
suburban environments, to be wholly content with a metropolitan context, and
mostly lived, in consequence, on the outskirts of cities. Had he been less bourgeois in this regard, he
might have become an even greater writer.
But his suburban integrity necessarily restricted his mode of thought to
a level compatible with bourgeois ethics, and so prevented its development into
the reaches of what might be termed higher proletarian writing. For it must be stressed that the highest
writing, the greatest thought, can only emerge from a writer of superior
intelligence who is resident in a large city, where the sensuous influence of
nature is negligible and a truly transcendental mode of writing can accordingly
develop. Those, on the contrary, who
confine themselves to the provinces or to the country inevitably detract from
their spiritual development and, to a greater or lesser extent, fall behind the
times. They develop a complacency in
nature and, frankly, such a complacency is incompatible with higher
spirituality, with writings that reflect a severance from and contempt of
nature!
As an example of this, I might cite a remark made by Colin
Wilson in the first instalment of his autobiography, Voyage to a Beginning,
in which he claimed to be the foremost genius of the age - indeed, one of only
two geniuses then at work in the world (the other apparently being a relatively
unknown friend of his, whose name eludes me).
Now Mr Wilson claimed priority in respect to his pre-eminent genius on
the grounds that he had gone beyond Existentialism and furthered the
development of a philosophy with a positivistic rather than a nihilistic
outlook. No doubt, there is a justification
of sorts for such a claim. For, these
days, anyone who doesn't go beyond Existentialism, in one way or another, has
no business considering himself a serious writer and thinker, let alone a
genius! In fact, he is unlikely to be
published. However, what especially
intrigues me here is that the author of this immodest autobiography doesn't
find his confinement to a small cottage on the Cornish coast a hindrance to his
genius, but, on the contrary, regards life in Cornwall as generally very acceptable,
if not preferable to the city. Clearly,
his genius isn't disturbed by the close proximity of temperate nature, but is
able to live in harmony with it, in spite of its sensuous essence.
Now anyone who lives for any length of time in such a simple environment,
as Mr Wilson has apparently done, isn't likely to develop the most anti-natural
sentiments, to become a contemporary Baudelaire or Mondrian, and consequently
his range of thought will be restricted,
in its formation, by complacency towards the natural, whether inorganic
or organic. The fact that Mr Wilson
hasn't waged a verbal war against nature would seem to be borne-out by the
content of his writings, in which no overtly, nor even covertly, transcendental
attitude is to be found. He does, however,
prefer writings of a philosophical order to mere story-telling, and this is
something for which we can admire him.
But whether he is the foremost genius of the age is, under the
circumstances, a somewhat debatable issue, especially in light of certain more
recent developments in contemporary thought which have led to a condemnation of
the natural and to a reappraisal of the transcendent, with particular reference
to what I have called the transcendental Beyond. That Mr Wilson may have had a justification
of sorts for considering himself the foremost genius of the age some thirty or
more years ago, we shall not question.
But whether such a justification still holds true now is highly
questionable, and had better be left for posterity to decide. No doubt, it ought not to be forgotten that
he was evaluating himself in relation to his contemporaries, not in relation to
either his predecessors or his successors.
He wasn't, for example, comparing himself with Aldous Huxley.
But was Huxley a genius, then?
There have been times when I was inclined to think so, bearing in mind
the content and scope of his work, particularly his late work. Nowadays, however, I am not so sure. There is a tricky borderline between men of
genius and the clever-clever, and sometimes it is possible to confound those on
the one side of that borderline with those on the other side of it. The clever-clever may, at times, have the
appearance of genius, but they are generally either too pedantic and pedagogic
or, conversely, too flashy and superficial.
Huxley undoubtedly had a fair amount of the former about himself, while
Evelyn Waugh might serve as a useful illustration of the latter. Genius, on the other hand, doesn't labour
over textbook citations or strive to impose a superficial cleverness upon
one. It is somewhat unique in that its
recipient is motivated by deeply personal or original thoughts which fight shy
of textbook authorities. Besides possessing
the necessary intellectual credentials of exalted thought, the genius is rather
one who pursues his own vision over the heads of and beyond the reach of lesser
men, and to such an extent that it often takes generations for the more
progressive members of society to catch-up with him and to properly appreciate
what he had to say. Rather than being
hampered by textbooks or numerous citations, the genius remains in the grip of
his particular thought, regardless of how radical it may be from a traditional
viewpoint. He is something of an
outsider and a rebel, a challenge to the literary establishment and a champion
of a higher sense of freedom. He leads
the intellectual or creative field by dint of his innate ability to transcend
the narrow boundaries of the conscious self.
He has 'intimations of immortality', in Wordsworth's oft-quoted phrase.
Now, given these criteria, there was doubtless something of the genius about
Aldous Huxley, though not a very great deal, considering his dependence on and,
like so many well-educated Englishmen, gentlemanly deference towards traditional
authority. At best, he might be
described as one of the clever-clever who occasionally attained to a level of
genius - in short, as a minor genius.
For it should not be forgotten that exalted thought was not always to be
found in Huxley's writings, and that he was more often than not a pedant and
expounder of other men's theories, including, as we have seen, those of the
American psychologist, W.H. Sheldon.
Moreover, he wasn't always particularly consistent with himself, and if
consistency is a hallmark of genius, as I incline to believe, then his lack of
it with regard to intellectual positions must inevitably tell against him. Nevertheless, what he did achieve in terms of
intellectual clarity and earnestness is sufficient to distinguish him from the
majority of his contemporaries, and to accord him an honourable place in the
eyes of posterity. In a generation that
produced no outstanding revolutionary genius, his status as a minor genius is
certainly not without merit. It simply
wasn't given to him to be another Nietzsche or Strindberg. And neither, seemingly, was it given to
anyone else.
Yet it was given to D.H. Lawrence to be an outstanding
traditional genius, and this fact we must readily acknowledge, if we are not to
do the man a grave disservice. For it
has long been contended among reputable literary critics, including Richard
Aldington, that D.H. Lawrence was the finest English novelist of his day, a
contention which, strictly within traditional terms, isn't without some
justification. Compared with Huxley,
Lawrence's novels are indeed stories, not philosophical tracts under the guise
of literature but genuine tales, replete with skilful characterization and
delicately-handled plot. Admittedly,
they aren't entirely devoid of philosophical significance. But, in contrast to Huxley's most
characteristic works, this significance is directly related to the story and
rarely detaches itself from the flow of events.
It is subordinate to the literature-proper, thereby maintaining a
traditional approach to the novel genre.
And this is so even of the late work, like Lady Chatterley's Lover,
in which the story-line greatly preponderates.
How different from Huxley's late work!
Take, for example, Island, in which the story-line, or what
passes for such, is often completely swamped by the philosophical content! What greater contrast, both thematically and
stylistically, could one hope to find than between the last works of these two
contemporaries? Lawrence remaining until
the bitter end an upholder of traditional subconsciously-dominated creativity,
Huxley tentatively aspiring further into revolutionary creativity under the
aegis of a superconscious bias. The
former an advocate of sensuality and the 'dark gods of the loins', the latter
advocating spirituality and 'the peace that passeth all understanding'. And yet, bearing in mind the criteria of
genius, Lawrence was no minor revolutionary figure but a major example of
traditional literary genius. He was the
most or, at any rate, one of the most - if one cannot discount the
overwhelmingly brilliant creative genius of John Cowper Powys - outstanding
fiction-writers of his generation, but, for all that, he remains a lesser
figure than the clever-clever Huxley, who had scant regard for tale-spinning narrative
traditions.
Now anyone who judges writers solely by traditional criteria
must accord Lawrence a creative superiority over Huxley. But anyone who realizes that the
twentieth century was a transitional age from illusory story-telling to literary
philosophy, then it should be apparent that Huxley's approach to the novel was
intellectually superior to Lawrence's and, consequently, that he was a more
important writer. Yes, he may be a minor
genius in his own context, but that cannot alter the fact that his work is
generally more important than the traditional work of a major genius. It exists on a higher plane of literary
evolution.
Nor are Lawrence and Huxley the only examples of this
transitional dichotomy. Of more recent
writers connected with the English literary scene, one might cite the
difference between Lawrence Durrell and Arthur Koestler in this respect. Fundamentally, Durrell is aligned with the
story-telling tradition and is thus more given, like D.H. Lawrence, to the
illusory. Also, like Lawrence, he is
something of a major genius, having produced a body of novels which must rank
with the finest traditional literature of the age. By comparison, Koestler is at best a minor
genius, a writer who, being predominantly clever-clever, only occasionally
frees himself from pedagogic predilections to soar into the realm of creative
genius. But, unlike Durrell, his work is
generally of a philosophical nature, both in terms of essays and his intensely
intellectual approach to the novel, and so stands on a higher level of literary
evolution. His last novel, The Call-Girls,
which focuses on an Alpine symposium of various scientists, was so
intellectually biased as almost to be a work of philosophy in itself, and
compares favourably, in this respect, with Huxley's Island, to which
novel it remains stylistically aligned.
Contrasted, on the other hand, with Lawrence Durrell's last fiction,
which was heavily illusory, it becomes clear that Koestler's late literature is
at least as far removed from Durrell as ...
Huxley's late literature was from Lawrence. It is difficult to conceive of anyone being
further apart, the likes of Kingsley Amis and John Fowles, or Anthony Burgess
and Iris Murdoch not excepted.
But what applies to England is also applicable, in varying
degrees, elsewhere in the world, where the transitional nature of the age is
likewise clearly apparent. We need only
cite the long-standing opposition in France between Camus and Sartre as an
example of that generation's dichotomy.
Camus was, of course, aligned with the story-telling approach to
literature and, as is well-known, prided himself on his fidelity to traditional
criteria of creative excellence. His was
the pagan, sensual, subconsciously-dominated approach of D.H. Lawrence and
Lawrence Durrell and, like them, he wasn't exactly bereft of genius. His novels, particularly The Outsider and The
Plague, remain masterpieces of narrative literature. Nevertheless they must stand on a lower rung
of the evolutionary ladder than such a revolutionary philosophical novel as
Sartre's Nausea, which pertains to the strictly contemporary, and is a
mode of avant-garde writing diametrically antithetical to that generally
practised by Huxley. By which I mean
that whereas Huxley primarily relates to the internal, religiously-oriented
world, Sartre, by contrast, relates primarily to the external,
politically-oriented one, and is therefore closer in spirit to Koestler, with
his scientific bias. Huxley's, one might
argue, is the subjective approach to the world, Sartre's, by contrast, the
objective approach to it. Translated
into painterly terms, this would mean that Huxley was aligned with
Transcendentalists like Mondrian and Kandinsky, while Sartre was aligned with
Social Realists like Lurçat and Guttuso.
It is the difference between essence and appearance - the former ends,
the latter means. Both, however, are
justified and necessary.
However, before I deal with that subject at greater length, let
me go on to point out some further examples of this transitional dichotomy, as
manifested in twentieth-century literature, this time German, and thereupon
equate Thomas Mann with the traditional approach and, conversely, Hermann Hesse
with the revolutionary one. Mann wrote
primarily with a view to telling a story, Hesse with a view to propounding his
religious philosophy. The former
philosophizes in moderation, the latter makes of philosophy his raison d'être. Between their last novels, The
Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Trickster in Mann's case, and The
Glass Bead Game in Hesse's, there is that radical distinction
we have already noted with regard to, amongst others, Huxley and Lawrence. Of the two writers, Hesse, with his
philosophical bias, is the greater, though it could well be argued that Mann
had more genius. If this is so, then we
mustn't forget that being a major genius in relation to the tradition is one
thing, being a minor genius in relation to the revolution quite another! Better, in my opinion, the latter than the
former.
Which state-of-affairs applies no less amongst Americans than
Europeans, so that we may accredit Henry Miller's work a special priority over
that of, say, Ernest Hemingway, despite the latter's unquestionable abilities
from the traditional point-of-view. Hemingway
spins stories, and does so well enough to win world-wide recognition. Miller, by contrast, dedicates himself to
telling the story of his life, and spices this up with speculations of a
philosophical order. He eschews literary
fictions in the interests of autobiography, which could be defined as
subjective fact, and to this is added the subjective truth of philosophy - at
any rate, of theoretical speculations and contentions about life in its
entirety, both as experienced externally and, especially, as reflected upon
internally. From this twofold approach
to literature he scarcely ever deviates, so that his novels remain consistently
revolutionary and, in the best sense of the word, contemporary. It would be a mistake, however, to describe
him as a major genius. For, at best, he
is only a minor one, and a minor one, at that, without even the compensatory
factor of being clever-clever. Yet his
consistently radical approach to the novel is sufficient to establish him as
the most revolutionary American author of his generation, and to accord him an
honourable place in the ranks of the international avant-garde. As a type he approximates more to the
subjective approach to the world than to its opposite, and may thus be
described as a transcendentalist. He is,
in a way, a less sophisticated version of Aldous Huxley. His nearest contemporary equivalent in
American writing is probably Norman Mailer, whose philosophical approach to
literature may be contrasted with the story-telling approach of, say, Gore
Vidal, an author who, on the whole, would appear to be aligned with the
narrative tradition.
We see, therefore, that the twentieth century gave rise to a
split between what in historical terms could be defined as the ancients and the
moderns - in other words, between the tail-enders of the literary tradition and
the pioneers of the literary revolution.
Generally speaking, the former have been blessed with more genius in
their own sphere of creativity than have the latter in theirs, nor need this
surprise us. For as a tradition reaches
its climax, it stands to reason that the finest writings in that context will
occur at the end rather than at the beginning of its development, to round it
off in an appropriately climatic fashion, in accordance with the dictates of
literary evolution. Consequently, where
the finest works of authors such as D.H. Lawrence, Lawrence Durrell, Albert
Camus, Thomas Mann, Ernest Hemingway, and Gore Vidal are concerned, the
literary tradition would seem to have reached its peak and is unlikely to
surpass itself. The fruit of the past
three centuries has attained to full ripeness in the great works of these men,
on whose shoulders rested the responsibility of its fulfilment. The narrative tradition was brought to a
fruitful end. Not altogether surprising,
therefore, if its practitioners should generally be blessed with more genius
than their revolutionary counterparts!
In terms of painting, one might cite the difference, in this
regard, between, say, Salvador Dali and Piet Mondrian, the former having been
blessed with a considerable degree of genius to bring an egocentric
representational tradition to full maturity, the latter not requiring any great
genius to execute his simplistic, post-egocentric paintings, which were destined
to initiate a new development in art.
Admittedly, to some extent Dali is also post-egocentric, insofar as his
work, particularly when surreal, often reflects a looking back and down upon
the subconscious from a higher psychic vantage-point. But the fact that he uses a
highly-accomplished egocentric technique in the service of figurative painting
renders his work more closely aligned with the tradition than that of virtually
any other Surrealist of his or, indeed, any other generation. Paradoxically, however, one is obliged to
contend that, despite his considerable representational genius, he ranks lower
in the evolution of art than Mondrian, who should therefore be regarded as his
artistic superior.
Returning to literature, we may infer that, in contrast to the
tail-enders of a tradition, the pioneers of a new development are unlikely to
be men of outstanding genius, but either men of no genius at all or only very
minor genius, its being understood that only towards the climax of a tradition,
especially an egocentric one, can great genius come to the fore, a level of
genius commensurate with the perfecting and completing of that tradition. Thus we needn't be surprised that the
post-egocentric writers have not, on the whole, been men of outstanding genius
but, rather, highly-talented foundation layers for the subsequent erection of
the higher, predominantly philosophical literature. Whether in the guises of Huxley, Koestler,
Sartre, Hesse, Miller, or Mailer, they have initiated or furthered a break with
the fictional tradition, and so paved the way for a much greater fidelity to
fact and truth in literature. We must
respect them as pioneers and leave it to other men, of greater genius, to
complete the new tradition in due course, whether or not such a completion is
likely to occur during the next hundred years.
I spoke a little while ago about appearance and essence in
literature and, in expanding on that subject, must now draw the reader's
attention to the fact that avant-garde writing in literature, as in art, is
divisible into that which focuses primarily on means and, conversely, that
which attends more closely to ends. The
first of these two categories, whether in terms of politics or science, has
found its leading practitioners in writers like Sartre, Koestler, and Mailer,
who may broadly be described as Social Realists. The second category, essentially being
concerned with religion and art, has found its leading practitioners in writers
like Huxley, Hesse, and Miller, who may broadly be described as
Transcendentalists. Those in the first
category are aligned with appearance, and thus means. Those in the second category, by contrast,
would seem to be aligned with essence, and thus ends. The first category adopts an extroverted
approach to the world, the second category an introverted one. Both, as already remarked, are necessary and
justified, but they aren't necessarily so at the same time. It could well be that, in the necessity of
putting means before ends, those who adopt the objective approach are more
relevant in the short term, whereas those whose approach is subjective appeal
to long-term solutions, and are accordingly less relevant at present. The former would be equalitarian, the latter
elitist. However, the former's art would
not be the highest but, rather, a comparatively second-rate art which was
simply of more applicability to the short-term goals of social evolution. The highest art could only issue from the
Transcendentalists, who, by concentrating on essence, point the way towards
Eternity. For, in the long run, spirit
must take priority over matter.
Clearly, then, in an age which stresses equalitarianism and is
tending, willy-nilly, towards a more equal society, the Social Realists are the
most relevant of avant-gardists. It may
seem strange that Socialist Realism should be equated with the avant-garde, but
its approach to the world is contemporary, if from a completely different angle
than Transcendentalism. After all, there
is nothing more contemporary, from a revolutionary standpoint, than the urban
proletariat. In the West, with the
general acceptance of Transcendentalism by the Establishment these days, the
Social Realists are the only genuine revolutionaries, whether in art or in
literature. The Establishment can accommodate
the long-term solutions of Transcendentalism because it doesn't feel directly
threatened by them in the short term. In
the former Soviet East, on the other hand, the Transcendentalists, as
traditionally manifesting in unofficial avant-garde art, have been regarded as
a revolutionary or subversive threat to the short-term interests of the
Socialist State. For their persistence
in long-term elitist solutions distracted from the immediate equalitarian goals
of socialism, which could only be encouraged by Socialist Realism. The situation in the Soviet East was
therefore quite the converse of that in the Liberal West where, by contrast,
Socialist Realism was and, in some sense, continues to be perceived as a threat
to the bourgeois status quo. The East
put means before ends, and thus concentrated on appearance. It had an objective and extrovert approach to
the world. The West, by contrast,
allowed the practitioners of ends to flourish, at any rate in a relative way,
and generally at the expense of means.
Viewed from a higher perspective, it would seem that the latter was
effectively in the wrong, even though it wasn't wholly given to a subjective
approach to the world but, in accordance with the paradoxical dictates of
bourgeois relativity, permitted the practitioners of means a certain amount of
creative freedom. Such freedom hasn't,
however, acquired the backing of the Establishment, nor can we reasonably
expect it to do so. For its
revolutionary nature isn't such as to approve of or encourage bourgeois
freedoms, of which the capitalist exploitation of the worker is traditionally
the most salient.
At the beginning of this essay I remarked that I was once a
disciple of Aldous Huxley, but had subsequently grown beyond him. Seen in the light of the above contentions,
my reasons for no longer regarding Huxley as my guru should be sufficiently
clear. I do not wish to make the fatal
mistake of putting ends before means and concentrating on essence when the
world cries out for a short-term solution in appearance. Like Nietzsche, I have turned against
essence-mongering in the interests of world betterment. I can no longer sympathize with the
individualist, elitist attitude propounded by Huxley; for it is destined to
failure, no matter how earnest its practitioner may happen to be. The attitude of de-centralist Ghandi-like
self-sufficiency, as illustrated by the guru-like figure of Propter in After Many a Summer,
is totally inadequate to meet the requirements of ultimate salvation. For such a salvation can only be brought
about through the most rigorous adherence to urban civilization and the
accompanying development of higher technology.
Naturalistic means of cultivating spirit in close proximity to nature
are invariably limited in scope, restricting the practitioner of such means to
a spirituality hampered by the sensual and, above all, by the natural body
itself. Unless we develop our
technology, in centralized cohesion, to a point where it will enable us to gradually
supplant the natural body with an artificial support-and-sustain system for the
brain, including the brain-stem and central nervous system, we shall never
attain to holy (pure) spirit in the transcendental Beyond. Unless we concentrate first on appearance and
then on essence, making the transformation of the phenomenal a precondition of
enhanced noumenal sensibility, we shall remain the sordid victims of a delusive
philosophy.
The modern world and, indeed, the modern novel have need, above
all, of a correct philosophical approach to the difficult problems which
confront the age. We needn't dismiss the
Transcendentalists out-of-hand, but we would be well-advised to give Social
Realists more credit in the short term.
Their political and scientific approaches to the world will serve as a foundation
for and springboard to the highest culture.
They will pave the way for the greatest genius!